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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
nounced by the courts of an overwhelming number of states. Bank v.
Bradley (1926), 136 S. C. 511, 134 S. E. 510; Leach v. Iowa State Saving
Bank (Ia. 1926), 211 N. W. 517.
The statute provides for a preference to the extent of the item or items
or for the balance payable upon a number of items which have been e-
changed. It is not probable, although the language might so indicate, that
the courts in construing this statute will permit a preference where the
owner of the item or items is another bank which is in the habit of col-
lecting for the insolvent institution and giving or accepting credit as the
balance might dictate. The decision in American Bank of De Soto v. Peo-
ple's Bank of De Soto (Mo. 1923), 255 S. W. 943, in which such a reciprocal
accounts arrangement existed, was justified in its refusal of a preference
upon this ground by the cases of Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh (1926),
313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W. 733 and Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh (1926),
314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W. 706.
It is noticed that the statute is silent in requiring that assets at least
equal in amount to the item or items for which preference is sought, be
present in the vault of the insolvent bank Or solvent correspondent banks,
at the time of failure of the former. It is perhaps indicated, however, by
this language ". .. irrespective of whether the fund representing such item
or items can be traced and identified as part of such items." It is con-
ceivable that since the courts are no longer burdened with reconciling their
positions with age-old principles, such a requirement by a construction of
this statute will be dispensed with.
With the exception of the proposition mentioned above, and that provided
for in sec. 10, Mo. Laws 1929, 207, which preserves the rights of the owner
of the item where remittance has been made in paper subsequently dis-
honored, the above statute appears a codification of the existing Missouri
doctrine, and has relieved the courts from the burden of justifying by
legal propositions and maxims a view in harmony with business practices.
Note (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. Ray. 406. F. E. M., '30.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGULATION OF ICE INDUSTRY IN ARKANSAS.-
An interesting development in recent legislation is to be found in Acts of
Arkansas, 1929, 110, Act No. 55, "An Act for the Regulation of the Sale,
Delivery and Distribution of Ice, and Vesting the Railroad Commission with
Jurisdiction over the Same." The Act provides (sec. 1) "that the use of
ice is a public necessity, the use, manufacture, sale, delivery and distribu-
tion thereof, within the State of Arkansas, has direct relation to the health,
comfort, safety, and convenience to the public, the same being a prime
necessity of life and monopolistic in its nature and price, manufacture, sale
and delivery and distribution of ice within the State of Arkansas is hereby
declared to be a public business impressed with a public trust and subject
to public regulation as hereinafter enacted." Provisions follow vesting the
power to regulate, supervise, establish and enforce prices and rates, re-
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quire records and fees, issue permits to new dealers after hearing, etc., in
the State Railroad Commission. The Act expressly repeals all laws in
conflict therewith, but it is not to be taken to apply to ice manufacturers
who consume their own product. The Act closes with a general emergency
provision declaring it effective from the date of its enactment.
The question at once arises whether such an industry can be made a
public utility by legislative fiat. That question seems to have been answered
in the main in the negative.
It is undoubtedly true that "a declaration by a legislature that a busi-
ness has become affected with a public interest is not conclusive of the
question whether attempted regulation on that ground is justified." Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas (1923), 262 U. S.
522. Citing that case, the Court later stated that "respect is due to a
legislature on a declaration of this kind so far as it relates to present facts.
But even as to them a Court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious
mistake, when the validity of the law depends on the truth of what is de-
clared." Chastleton Corporation v. Rent Commission (1924), 264 U. S.
548. The same rule would apply to the declarations in the Act that the
industry is a prime necessity of life, and monopolistic as to its nature and
the price.
The Wolff case, supra, is considered as a guidepost in the limitation of
governmental regulation of an industry. The case involved the validity
of action by the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations in prescribing a
wage scale in the business of a corporation engaged in slaughtering hogs
and cattle and preparing the meat for sale and shipment. The Court held
that the provision of the Kansas statute granting such power was uncon-
stitutional as violating the guaranty of liberty found in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. A few extracts from the
opinion of Taft, C. J., are significant. After holding that "legislative au-
thority to abridge freedom of contract can be justified only by exceptional
circumstances, and the restraint must not be arbitrary or unreasonable,"
he proceeds to classify businesses said to be clothed with a public interest
into three classes: (a) those which are carried on under authority of a
public grant or franchise, as common carriers and public utilities; (b)
certain exceptional occupations, historically regarded as of public interest,
and so regulated, as inns, cabs, and grist mills; and (c) other businesses
which have come to have such a peculiar relation to the public that govern-
ment regulation has been superimposed upon them-where the owner, by
devoting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public an inter-
est in that use, and subjects himself to regulation to the extent of that
interest. Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U. S. 113. An older classification,
stressing the legal or virtual monopoly, is found in State v. Kinlooh Tele-
phone Co. (1902), 93 Mo. A. 349, 67 S. W. 684. The Court further states
"whether the public has become so peculiarly dependent on a particular
business that the owner, by engaging therein, subjects himself to intimate
public regulation, must be determined from the facts of each case. The
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option to deal or abstain from dealing usually distinguishes private from
quasi-public occupations."
The statute in the Wolff case, as applied to packing plants, is, for the
same reason, invalid as applied to coal mines. Dorchy v. Kansas (1924),
264 U. S. 286. A further provision of the Act, regulating the hours of
labor in such industries as packing plants, was declared invalid. Wolff
Packing Co. v. Kansas Industrial Court (1924), 267 U. S. 552. The recent
attempt in New York to regulate the price of theatre tickets resulted in a
nullification of the law in question. Tyson v. Banton (1926), 273 U. S.
418. It has also been held that the charges of a labor agency are not a
proper subject for statutory regulation. Ribnick v. McBride (1928), 277
U. S. 350.
A significant note in these cases would seem to be that the regulation,
where it has been favored at all, has been a regulation of a rate or charge
for service, as in the cases of carriers, utility companies, and inns. In
almost every instance an attempt to regulate the price of a commodity or
wages has met with defeat. If that be the test the Arkansas Act in
question seems invalid, although it is not always easy to distinguish be-
tween a commodity and a service. It has been held that an attempt to
regulate the prices of oil and gas is distinctly beyond the power of the
legislature. Williams v. Standard Oil Co. (1929), 278 U. S. 235. To again
quote the Wolff case, "It has never been supposed since the adoption of the
Constitution that the business of the butcher, or the baker, the tailor, the
wood chopper, the mining operator or the miner was clothed with such
a public interest that the price of his product or his wages could be fixed
by state legislation. It is true that in the days of the early common law
an omnipotent Parliament did regulate prices and wages as it chose, and
occasionally a Colonial legislature sought to exercise the same power; but
nowadays one does not devote one's property to public use, or clothe it
with a public interest, merely by making commodities for, and selling them
to, the public, in the common callings." The Act in question would seem
to attempt that.
It must be conceded that the rule seems to have been relaxed in cases
of actual emergencies of a serious nature. Temporary laws regulating
rentals in cities have been upheld, when passed to relieve the housing con-
ditions occasioned by concentration in cities during a war period. Chastle-
ton Corporation v. Rent Commission (1924), 264 U. S. 543; Brown Holding
Co. v. Feldman (1920), 256 U. S. 170; Levy Leasing Co. v. Stern (1922),
258 U. S. 242. The same principle has been applied to the temporary
regulation of wages of railway labor to avert a threatened strike of
national character and the resulting industrial paralysis. Wilson v. New
(1917), 243 U. S. 332. But the general declaration of emergency in sec. 24
of the Arkansas Act seems rather to apply to the necessity for the Act to
become effective immediately on passage rather than to any dire necessity
or emergency requiring such a regulation of the industry as here sought.
Even if construed as declaring an emergency, the declaration would by
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no means be conclusive. Nor would the declaration that the industry
is monopolistic in its nature.
It would seem then that the Act in question must fail to meet the test of
constitutionality, if its validity is contested. But that observation is by
no means conclusive. It would seem that the same bases upon which cer-
tain industries were declared clothed with a public interest, by judicial
interpretation or legislative enactment, may, with changing conditions
and increasing public dependence, be held to exist in the industry here de-
clared subject to regulation. If that view be accepted it is easily con-
ceivable that the Act providing for regulation of the ice industry in a
southern state is valid. C. V. E., '31.
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